Realism and Human Rights: Striking the Balance in American Foreign Policy

 A Discussion Co-Moderated by:

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies, The Nixon Center

Joseph K. Grieboski, President, The Institute on Religion and Public Policy

Held: August 28, 2002, at The Nixon Center

Meeting Report

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies, The Nixon Center, opened the meeting by expressing his hopes that it would initiate a dialogue that could be of practical benefit to policymakers, advocates, practitioners, and analysts.

He observed that the emerging "Bush Doctrine" in foreign affairs takes as its fundamental task ensuring the security of the United States and protecting American interests, but expresses a preference for working with democratic states and encouraging the spread of democratic regimes around the world. However, what happens when such regimes don't exist in states that are of vital strategic significance to the United States? In the fall 2002 issue of The National Interest, Adam Garfinkle describes this "the impossible imperative" vis-à-vis the Arab world, but it also applies to many other parts of the world. [hyperlink: http://www.nationalinterest.org/issues/69/garfinkle.html]

The President himself is aware of the tension between these two imperatives. At his speech at West Point (1 June 2002), he proclaimed: "The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world." However, the president seemed to place primary responsibility for this not on American intervention, but on domestic evolution within countries. After describing the aspirations of people around the world for liberty, he said, "And their governments should listen to their hopes." The message seems to be that the United States would like other regimes, especially those of its allies and partners, to respect and promote human rights. On the other hand the priority of the American government is not to force change but to encourage governments to begin the process toward evolving into more open, democratic, and pluralistic societies.

It is becoming clear, however, that in many parts of the world--certainly in Central and Eastern Europe, throughout much of Eurasia, in Latin America and Africa and East Asia--we are no longer dealing with what used to be termed "totalitarian" regimes. Instead, we have a varying patchwork of "managed democracies" or "semi-authoritarian" regimes in which some degree of pluralism is fostered. In many vulnerable, weak, or newly emerged states, governments may feel that they cannot safely extend a full range of social and political rights without inviting instability. This problem can be magnified when other states, in restricting or limiting pluralism, affect groups that have significant influence within the United States. This has certainly been a driving factor in increased interest in U. S. government circles with the question of international religious freedom. There is also the perennial issue as to the extent to which the American model can be transplanted to other states and societies. Often, criticism is advanced that American standards are not necessarily universal ones for the protection of human rights and freedoms. All of these factors can affect bilateral relations between the United States and other countries. [A detailed examination of this issue was provided in Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Managing Pluralism", World Policy Journal, Winter 2001/02, hyperlink: http://www.globaldem.org/pdfs/Gvosdev_World_Policy_Journal.pdf ]

Striking the balance between national interests and human rights is not simply an academic question, but one that has real policy implications. Gvosdev cited Uzbekistan as an example. The United States is now basing forces and equipment in Uzbekistan. We view Uzbekistan as a key partner and a front-line state in the war on terrorism and the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan. We are committing aid for economic reform and development. We would like to encourage political reform, but to be frank, Uzbekistan is an authoritarian dictatorship (Freedom House classifies it as "not free," assigning Uzbekistan a rating of 7 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties). One of the most contentious issues between Tashkent and Washington is the question of the more than 7000 "political detainees." Most of them are accused of membership in Hezb ut-Tahrir. Well, is Hezb ut-Tahrir a group of peaceful Islamists committed to moral revival, who are prepared to operate within the rules of a democratic society? Or are they are a terrorist organization seeking to undermine pro-American, secular regimes in Central Asia? Should governments be allowed to detain Hezb ut-Tahrir activists on the grounds they pose a security threat, or should they be allowed to function as long as their activities are non-violent?

Gvosdev noted that the U. S. has legitimate concerns that "security" and "fighting terrorism" not become catch all justifications for all sorts of nefarious actions. On the other hand, context cannot be neglected. Some observers have compared present-day Uzbekistan with South Korea forty years ago--an authoritarian state that has the capacity to evolve into a functioning democracy over time. Is it in U. S. interests, for example, to push for change in Uzbekistan that might destabilize a regime which, as authoritarian and dictatorial as it is, nonetheless is expanding its contacts with the West, including sending students to study in Western universities---who could form future government cadres--especially if the only viable alternative to Islam Karimov is not going to be a more open and pluralist government, but another authoritarian regime one that is openly anti-American and which works against U.S. security interests?

Joseph K. Grieboski, President of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, opened his remarks by pointing out that the unanimous passage by Congress in 1998 of the International Religious Freedom Act, establishing an Office of International Religious Liberty within the State Department (headed by an ambassador-at-large) as well a semi-autonomous government agency, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, has resulted in a much greater emphasis within government policymaking on the integration of the issues of religious freedom within overall U. S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, how can we reconcile the "two-message" system within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, one that works to promote security interests, the other to enhance human rights? How do we integrate human rights issues, which is an essentially idealistic endeavor, within the realism of U. S. foreign policy making?

Grieboski observed that part of the mandate of the U. S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is to integrate more fully religious liberty issues into overall U.S. foreign policy. One of the issues the Commission is facing, in doing so, is that very often the loudest voices on religious freedom are those affiliated with a specific religious group. These are the voices that often have the least experience in policy, however, and are therefore recommending policy options that are implausible. The 2000 Report of the U. S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, for example, recommended that the U. S. government establish a no-fly zone over southern Sudan to protect the animists and Christians from being bombed by the forces controlled by the Islamist government in the north. In making this judgment, however, the Commission didn't address any of the practical issues such a recommendation entails--who will provide the force, where will it be based, under what mandate will it operate, and so on. In the 2002 Report, the Commission recommends that the U. S. use all of its diplomatic influence with the government of North Korea to protect religious freedom.

Grieboski is concerned that even those agencies and departments charged with the task of trying to engage policymakers on behalf of human rights issues are unable to dialogue and therefore having little impact on practical policy. This can lead to problems down the road. Grieboski observed that had there been a closer integration of human rights/religious freedom concerns with intelligence gathering and policymaking, events such as the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan or the increase in sectarian violence in volatile regions such as Kashmir, Indonesia, or Malaysia--all of which have serious impacts on U.S. security and economic interests--might have garnered greater attention before problems erupted.

The discussion that followed touched upon such questions as the means to nurture civil societies in other states (and assist in gradual transitions to more democratic and open forms of governance), the acceptable "zone" for differences in interpretation of human rights norms and their applicability, whether "double standards" are a necessary component for policy, and the degree to which the question of "human rights" becomes a single-issue lobby in isolation from other key questions (trade, security, etc.) in foreign policy. Of especial concern was the linkage between the nature of regimes and security challenges to the United States, and the extent to which the "quality, character, and human tolerability" of governance of other regimes impacts American interests. For the foreseeable future, there will continue to be an oscillation in American foreign policy between accommodating and ignoring human rights considerations in the formulation of policy.

Joseph K. Grieboski
President
Institute on Religion and Public Policy