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ANALYSIS
OF THREE BILLS ON
FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN BULGARIA INTRODUCED
IN THE 39TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY The
report is drafted by order of the
Human Rights and Religious Confessions Committee at
the 39th National Assembly and
is intended to enter the same Committee and Assembly upon
submission on May 27, 2002 IN
THE CENTER FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM -
SOFIA By
Viktor Kostov The
report is available on-line at: http://bclf.tripod.com/religiousbill.htm
in Bulgarian http://bclf.tripod.com/religiousbillengl.htm
in English or
through
http://bclf.tripod.com Sofia,
Bulgaria MAY
2002 CONTENTS OF THE
PRESENTATION GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE
INTRODUCED BILLS................................................
7 PROBLEMS OF THE
MILCHEV-KRIKORYAN BILL........................................................
8
This report offers a review
of motions for a new law on religious matters in Bulgaria. The
Milchev-Krikoryan
and
Tzekov
bills do not meet the
requirements of the
highest-ranking
Bulgarian legislation on
issues of freedom of religion, from the Constitution and the
ECHR.
In spirit, as well as in a
number of specific provisions, these bills are regulatory and establish severe
administrative controls over the conscience and activities of religious
believers. The flaws of these bills are
at both conceptual and
specific-provision levels. The most significant flaw of the
Milchev-Krikoryan
bill is that it introduces a
state body that establishes control over conscience and religion, which would
call for a sizeable agency apparatus . a .conscience police. . to carry out the
law. The most problematic aspect of the Tzekov
bill is that, through a
series of enactments, it voids the individual and absolute nature of the right
to freedom of religion. The bill renders religious confession dependent on an
institution in the name of increasing efficiency in state control over religion
and its exercise. These
bills, if passed in their current drafts, would directly violate a series of
enactments and principles of the CRB and the ECHR
and would be a step backward in the course toward democracy and civil society in
Bulgaria. The bills are problematic in
the sense that they
introduce religious-based
discrimination, introduce more restrictions of the right to freedom of religion
than provided for in the
ECHR,
use inconsistent and unclear
terminology, neglect the recommendations of the Experts from the Council of
Europe on drafting a bill on religious matters, and introduce a complicated and
discriminatory procedure for creating legal entities on a religious basis. Furthermore, the bills have a dual
nature in that some parts of the bills proclaim freedom of religion, and others
deny it. They introduce a
registration system in which the state grants .permission. for faith, and they
create а
Directorate on Religious
Confessions, which has the functions of a state body and more or less acts as a
control over people.s consciences. The third bill . that of
Mestan and Yusseine . is far more democratic and, after a number of amendments,
could become a fair and democratic law on freedom of religion in Bulgaria.
The recommendations to the
legislator are to accord with European terminology and to take into account the
fact that freedom of religion is already settled in the CRB and the ECHR,
so a future law ought only to further develop these freedoms without introducing
any restrictions. The legislator
should also take into account the complexity of the freedom of
religion,
which is
exercised in combination
with other basic rights and freedoms such as freedom of speech, of assembly
indoors without a permit, of association, etc. Restricting it would inevitably lead to
restrictions on these rights as well. In a future law, the legislator needs to
explicitly confirm the right to the exercise of religion without association and
formal registration, as well as keep a consistent division of the state from
religious communities and institutions. A specific approach to a law
on freedom of religion that corresponds to a course toward free civil society
would be passing a limited law on religious matters. This law would abrogate all
current enactments on this matter and would provide solely for the
transformation of existing religious confessions and religious organizations
into legal entities under the Law for Non-Profit Legal Entities. The law would
provide only for tax and custom-tariff concessions for religious organizations
with charitable and social activity. The Directorate on Religious Confessions,
or any similar body for state-religious activity, would be closed down or would
keep only their statistical-informational functions. Thus, the right to freedom
of religion, already settled in the CRB and the ECHR,
would gain real value . if
religious organizations are non-profit, their operating on the same footing as
other non-profit organizations would result in the just elimination of
religious-based discrimination. Rules for religious organizations would be the
same as those for all other non-profit organizations. Those believers who did
not wish to associate formally could exercise their activities without the
umbrella of a registered organization. This is a fast, economical, lawful and
just way of providing freedom of religion and free exercise of religion and
separating state from religion. BCP
. Bulgarian Communist
Party BOC .
Bulgarian Orthodox
Church ECHR,
the
Convention .
the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ratified by
Bulgaria and part of internal Bulgarian law since September 1992) The
Expert Opinion .
By
request of the Council of Europe:
Summary
of the main conclusions of principles presented in an Opinion and a Summary
Draft
by Prof.
L.L.
Kristian,
Leuven-la Neuve University,
Belgium; Opinion, Prof.
Malcolm
Evans,
Bristol
University,
Great
Britain;
Opinion
by Prof.
Dr.
R.А.
Lossen,
in collaboration with Dr.
B.К.
Labuchane
and Mr. К.
Goluke,
Leiden University,
Holland,
on Draft Bill on Religious
Confessions in Bulgaria,
January-February
2001, Bulgarian
translation.[1] Experts
from the Council of Europe.the authors of
the Expert Opinion. CRB,
the
Constitution .
the Constitution of the
Republic of Bulgaria CC .
Constitutional Court of
Bulgaria CМ .
Council of Ministers of
Bulgaria Laws within a democracy are
a device for regulating relations in society in a way that can help create
order, peace and prosperity in an environment of freedom and respect for
individual dignity. Justice is what guarantees each freedom, and if justice is
the motivation behind the formation of laws, those laws will reflect it in that
freedom. However, with the wrong conceptions behind them, laws can also become
manifestations of oppressive moods and instruments for persecution, including
religious-based persecution. Twelve years after the fall
of the single-party ideological dictate over conscience and freedom in Bulgaria,
social and legislative moods regarding issues of freedom of religion are still
confused and unfocused.
Whether tomorrow Bulgarian
society sets a course toward freedom or tyranny depends to a large extent on the
line the Bulgarian Parliament follows today in treating religious conscience and
belief. The purpose of this
presentation is to submit a comment on three bills for a new law on religious
matters in Bulgaria, introduced in the 39th National Assembly. The
bills analyzed are the Bill for a Law on Religious
Confessions,
introduced by deputy
Borislav Tzekov on July 5,
2001,
the
Bill for a Law on Religious
Confessions introduced by deputies Kiril Milchev and Roupen Krikoryan on April
26, 2002,
and the
Bill for a Law on Religious
Rights and Religious Association,
introduced by deputies
Lyutvi Mestan and Ahmed Yusseine,
also on April 26,
2002.
For brevity, these bills are
referred hereinafter by the last names of the persons who introduced them. For
example, .Milchev-Krikoryan. will stand for the bill introduced by these two
deputies. In
this opinion, we outline the major weaknesses of the aforementioned bills, in
some cases supporting resolutions if amended accordingly. We have also evaluated
the bills with reference to the standards of the highest-ranking legislation on
freedom of religion in force in our country . the Constitution (CRB) and the
European
Convention for Defense of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms
(ECHR). Reference is also made to the recommendations of Experts from the
Council of Europe to the Bulgarian legislator regarding a bill on religious
confessions entered in the 38th National
Assembly. We
hope thereby that the quality of the future law
will
reach the level set by these standards, which the Bulgarian people should become
accustomed to. The structure of this
presentation follows each bill separately, outlining only those texts and
statements of principle that contradict the logic of the law or of
higher-ranking laws that settle the matters. We draw attention to the conceptual
mistakes in the texts regarding the right to free exercise of religion. Our
assumption is that a mistaken concept or philosophy behind a bill suffices to
negate its fitness for enactment within this delicate sphere. Therefore, the
presentation does not examine the bills in depth, assuming that detail would be
necessary only if the rationale behind the bills were
satisfactory.
However, this is not the
case with two of the three bills. Following a separate
analysis of the bills, we submit a summary of the basic international standards
on issues of freedom of religion and conscience. In the concluding section, we
present a draft of our recommendation for a specific, fast, practice-proven, and
just solution for an appropriate legislative attitude toward religion.
It is important to emphasize
that a basic principle behind the drafting of a new law should be the fact that
freedom
of religion is a matter already settled in Bulgarian
legislature. There are a
sufficient number of enactments in the CRB and the ECHR (which is part
of the internal Bulgarian law).
Therefore, a future law on
religious matters need not deal with conceptual issues and redefinitions of
already settled enactments. Rather, it ought to clarify some of the practical
aspects of the already settled freedom of conscience and religion in Bulgaria.
This practical approach, of course, cannot be taken to extremes by settling
separate cases and arguments on church and religious issues. We will briefly
explain how regulation of religion at the .legal level. is even unnecessary, or
if so only to a very limited extent. TITLES
AND TERMINOLOGY OF THE BILLS The title of each bill ought
to be an accurate reflection of its contents. The terms .religious confessions.
and .confessions. were used by totalitarian authorities, and in the law from
1949; their purpose
was to control faith and its manifestation. This makes the term .religious
confession.
largely undesirable in the title of a bill.
However, it is used by the authors of both the Tzekov and Milchev-Krikoryan
bills. The title of the bill should
imply an intent on the part of the legislator to progress to a new and
openminded settlement of the issue of religion in Bulgaria. Also, Bulgaria.s
advancement and its integration into Europe with regard to freedom of religion
should be reflected in the terminology used. A law titled .Law on Religious
Confessions. smacks of the former Communist Law on Confessions from
1949.
Although
legal traditions are a positive phenomenon
that can help bring about a stable society, the kind
of .continuity. demonstrated
in the very titles of two of the bills is contrary to a path toward democracy
and civil society in Bulgaria.[2] Furthermore,
the term .religious confession,. as used in the
Bulgarian Constitution, means something slightly different from the terms used
in Article 9 of the ECHR.
The ECHR speaks of .freedom
of religion. and .free exercise of religion.. The CRB should use the same
terminology, as the ECHR is part of Bulgarian law. Therefore, .freedom of
religious confession. in the CRB
ought to be treated as a term implying .freedom of
religion.
or .free exercise of
religion. (The titles of the two bills for .Law on Religious Confessions. are
thus, de facto, drafts for a .Law on Religion.). Moreover, the very term
.religious confession. has a dual
meaning.
The CRB uses it in the sense
of (1)
right to choice and exercise
of faith[3]
[4]
and (2)
organization of associated
people apropos of that faith. These are two radically different notions that
cannot be applied as synonyms.[5]
Unfortunately, the Tzekov
and Milchev bills use this confusion to impose ridiculous requirements on
believers and their organizations . the right to freedom of religion in them is
brought down to having a religious institution. With this in mind, we
recommend a more appropriate title of the future law, namely: .LAW ON FREEDOM OF
RELIGION IN BULGARIA..
This complies with the two
main requirements for the thrust of a new law:
a change toward freedom
instead of restriction, and standardization of legal terminology with that of
Europe. This of course would be a positive development, provided that the
contents of such a bill actually corresponded to the title.
There are other problems as
well with the terminology used in the bills. For example, the use of the term
.citizens. complicates matters for the authors of the Tzekov bill. Article 1 in
this bill states that it concerns Bulgarian citizens. This automatically
excludes a number of people who are under the jurisdiction of Bulgaria but are
not citizens of Bulgaria. The author of the bill introduces in a further
provision other categories to cover those who are not .citizens.. However,
instead of clarifying the scope of operation of the law, this makes it all the
more confusing.[6] Instead, the legislator
should standardize the terms used to describe who the religious freedom
legislation addresses with those of the ECHR, which states that freedom of
conscience and religion is a right belonging to everyone.[7]
This would help avoid
ambiguity as to who bears the rights laid down in the law.
GENERAL
EVALUATION OF THE INTRODUCED
BILLS In general, the Tzekov and
Milchev-Krikoryan bills are oriented toward regulating and restricting the right
to freedom of religion. Both bills proclaim compliance with European and world
standards that confirm freedom of religion and exercise of religion. At the same
time, both bills bind the right to freedom of religion and to its exercise into
the context of an institution, ignoring the individual, absolute and inviolable
nature of these rights. This results in the wrongful introduction of state
control over conscience and religious faith and its manifestation.
Both bills introduce in
different forms a state executive body, the Directorate on
Religious Confessions, for monitoring the activity and organization of
believers. If the Milchev-Krikoryan bill were to become a law in its present
form, it would introduce an agency which would serve as a .conscience police,.
as its enactments are so restrictive that they would allow intervention by the
state in the religious life of believers and their
organizations. Both bills stipulate a heavy
registration arrangement for making religious groups into legal
entities. They tie the registration
of religious entities to the right to freedom of religion and free exercise of
religion. It is on this miscomprehension or intentional disregard for the
individual nature of the right to freedom of religion that we focus on in the
section with the detailed analysis of the bills. The purpose and result of a
religious registration requirement in order to have freedom of religion is to
introduce a mechanism of control over the right to freedom of conscience and
religious belief. (In the analysis
of the Tzekov bill, we study the mechanism for introducing this
control.) Both bills introduce
religious-based
discrimination
by providing special
treatment for one particular institution of a particular religion. Additionally,
these bills additionally allow intervention in the internal affairs of this
institution, and the Tzekov bill allows for theological statements in one of the
provisions. In contrast to these
tendencies as described, the eventual future law should apply instead a
principle of positive law regarding
religion,
not one allowing its
exercise only by permission. Positive law treats citizens and their
organizations with trust, and penalizes only those that break the law. Allowance
by permission, on the other hand,
is an approach
that
penalizes
everyone based on the
assumption that all are offenders and can exercise their freedoms only after
proving their nonviolent attitudes toward the state. Such an approach, although
.inherited. in this society, cannot coexist with modern civil society. Some
examples of the allowance-by-permission approach can be seen in the following
provisions of the bills:
In spite of the restrictive
nature of both of these bills, they do contain some neutral provisions and even
some that do promote aspects of the right to freedom of religion. However, these
aspects deal with property relations, not the right to religious confession.
Such are the provisions for tax concessions for religious organizations. On the
whole, the positive features of these two bills are negligible and do not make
them a competent source of rule-proclaiming material. Unlike these two bills, the
third one . that of Mestan and Yusseine . has a positive orientation and
philosophy. De facto, this bill does what is necessary to establish a
fundamentally acceptable attitude toward a future law in the sphere of religion
. it clarifies freedom of religion in accordance with already-settled law both
internal (in
the CRB and the ECHR, both
integrated in Bulgarian law)
and external (European
standards). Although this bill contains some restrictive texts that conflict
with these enactments and with the recommendations of the Council of Europe,
amending or deleting them could make this document serve well toward the
drafting of a future law on freedom of religion in Bulgaria.
PROBLEMS
OF THE MILCHEV-KRIKORYAN BILL
In this section, my comments
are mostly on the problematic aspects of the bill. In the conclusion, I present
a possible way that this bill could serve in helping draft a future law on
freedom of religion in Bulgaria. Chapter One Art.2
(3).
This Article contains more
provisions for restricting freedom of religion than does Article 9 of the
ECHR.
The Convention does not
provide for restriction of the right to freedom of religion on the grounds of
.use for
political purposes.
or .jeopardizing
national security..
Regarding
similar restrictions in a previous bill draft, European experts
commented,
.Exercise of religion can be
restricted if authorities consider . that this exercise is directed against
national interests . or is used for political purposes.These are vague
assumptions that leave broad space for interpretation. Will religious
communities be able to support the poor, or raise a voice against abortion . or
will that, too, be considered as pursuing a political purpose?.[8] Art. 4,
5. These provisions redefine
the complex right to freedom of religion by restricting the manifestation of
religious beliefs and their free propagation. Contradicting Art. 3, Art. 5
introduces a by-permit arrangement for the public manifestation of religious
beliefs. Permission is to be granted by the municipal authorities. This is an
intervention by the state in the activities of believers, and thus constitutes
religious-based discrimination. In contrast, mere notification of the municipal
authorities suffices for non-religious groups to be able to express their
beliefs through similar manifestations. Obviously, the bill introduces a
preference for atheists over believers in God. Experts from the Council of
Europe point out that freedom of religion and conscience is a .multi-dimensional
right.. According to these experts, .The freedom of
an individual to manifest his/her religion is applicable not only in community
with others, in public or among those whose faith the individual shares: this
freedom can also be asserted individually or in private; furthermore, this
freedom . includes the right to attempt to persuade a neighbor, for example,
through some teaching. If violated, this right would make a dead letter out of
Article 9 (of the ECHR . author.s note), which guarantees .the freedom of an
individual to change their religion and beliefs...[9] Art.
9.
This Article introduces the
term .institutions of the religious confessions..
The provision requires that
a religious community act through an .institution.. This constitutes state
intervention in the free exercise of religious faith. Why should a law require
that a religious community operate through an institution? This would entail
restrictions on individual religious manifestation, since members of religious
communities would only be able to exercise religious beliefs through
institutions. Mandatory association
is introduced with an eye toward controlling the public exercise of religion.
This is a violation of the Constitution and of Art. 9
of the ЕCHR.[10] Art.
12.
Useless repetition of
Constitutional text. Art.
14.
This Article expands upon a
Constitutional provision. What is the meaning of the phrase that .Eastern
orthodoxy. has .a historic role. and .living importance.
in the life of the Bulgarian
state?
The text calls to mind the
recent .leading and historic role. of a certain ideological machine . the BCP .
which occupied all levels of state structures. This portion
of
the bill creates an
unconstitutional relationship between religious belief and state structures. The
state ought to remain separated from religious institutions. Anything
otherwise is a violation of
Art.
13, par. 2 of the
Constitution. Chapter Two In general, this chapter
regulates property issues concerning religious communities, using existing
legislation as its basis. Art. 12
(2). This Article restricts
freedom of speech and the freedom to obtain and distribute information, as
guaranteed by Articles 38,
39, 40 and
41
of the Constitution. It also
makes the existence of non-profit organizations founded by religious confessions
pointless. These organizations cannot manifest religious beliefs through their
activities. After all, they are founded not by secular or atheist groups, but by
religious ones. This is also in inadmissible conflict with Art. 10 of the ECHR.
Art.
19-21.
These Articles are positive
provisions for tax and fee exemption. They grant freedom of religion and
conscience its proper place in the set of values of the legislator and society.
Chapter Three In
this chapter, the bill.s author generally displays a favorable attitude toward
charitable activities by religious organizations. Notwithstanding this attitude,
the regulatory tendency as shown in the General Provisions is present here as
well. Art.
26.
This provision illustrates
the police-like nature of the Directorate of Religious Confessions as outlined
in Chapter Four of the bill. How will the Directorate see to .the exercise of
the individual right of religious confession.? What is the meaning of
.individual right of religious confession.
in this particular case? The
bill gives no answer to these questions. This is evidence of intervention of the
state in the activities of religious organizations and a hampering of the individualistic nature of the right.
One inherent characteristic
of the freedom of religion is that .the state does not judge any religion or
belief..[11] Application of Art. 26 would
violate that principle. Chapter Four Generally, this chapter
defines the functions of the Directorate on Religious Confessions, which is a
state body with executive power to deal with issues of religion and religious
freedom in Bulgaria. This body is intended to exert full control over the
consciences of believers and their communities. Both the letter and the spirit
of this chapter of the bill conflict with the highest-ranking legislation in
Bulgaria, international standards on human rights and freedom of religion, and
the recommendations of the Experts from the Council of Europe.
We will highlight only
paragraph 2,
which requires that the
Directorate approve all religious instruction courses in the country but
provides no definition of .religious
instruction..
Thus, this term would cover any
teaching of faith and expression of religious belief. The rights of the state
administration to exert control over religion are practically unlimited. Even if
the term
.religious
instruction. were to be
defined, the state should have control over only state-run schools; state and
society are not synonymous concepts. In a free society, the state cannot take on
all functions. Paragraph
3
requires permission from the
Directorate to involve so-called .cult ministers. from abroad. This is an
inadmissible intervention of the state in the internal life of a religious
community. If the state is not allowed to express its opinion on issues of
theology and the value of a certain religion, why is it given the right to limit
the personal contacts of ministers of faith and decide who can and cannot
minister? This is an internal issue of a religious group. No such restriction is
stipulated for any other type of activity in society . contacts between
businessmen, non-religious non-profit organizations,
sportsmen, etc. If a private
company invites a PR expert from abroad to launch a successful publicity
campaign in Bulgaria, would it be acceptable for the Minister of Finance to give
permission to the managers of the company
to invite that person? Paragraph
11.
The Directorate keeps a
registry of unregistered religious groups! Some religious group may not wish to
register as its own legal entity, and this is a legally guaranteed right of
freedom of religion. Registration as a legal entity is not always the way for
.materializing. the will of individuals with identical beliefs. The purpose of
registration is not to serve as state permission for religious activity before
society. Why and how can people with identical beliefs, but who do not wish to
have a formal association, be forced to have one against their will? This
stipulation reveals the desire of the authors of the bill to .institutionalize.
in some way the individual and absolute right to freedom of conscience and
religion, and thus exert control over it. The desire for control of the authors
here takes on an obscure and hazardous air. Another feature of the motive behind
this article is a lack of understanding about the individual and absolute nature
of the freedom of conscience and religion. This right belongs to the human
individual, not to the organization created by a group of individuals. It is
unacceptable to force believers to register their beliefs with a state
body.[12]
Chapter Five This
chapter provides for a mechanism through which religious confessions can acquire
the status of legal entities upon registration in court. The restrictive aspect
here is that this can be done only at Sofia City Court,
regardless
of the residence of the religious confession. This is definitely an
inconvenience for many applicants. A registry of buildings for public worship is
to be kept. What is the need for such a registry? For rapid police action
against .dangerous. prayers in the buildings
of
public worship, or for encouraging the public to visit those buildings? This is
definitely religious-based discrimination. Art.
42.
This Article provides for denial of
registration of a legal entity, in case the latter is used for .political
purposes. or jeopardizes .national security.. Although the CRB also provides
such grounds for restricting the right to freedom of religion, they are not
found in the ECHR. According to Art.
5, par. 4
of the CRB, the ECHR trumps
the CRB on Bulgarian territory. So regardless of the what the Constitution says
about these cases, these provisions are not applicable because of their conflict
with Art. 9 of the ECHR, which provides only three grounds for restriction of
the right to religion.[13] Chapter Six This chapter provides for a
mechanism for restricting the right to religious confession.
Without going into detail
about this mechanism[14], it should be
pointed out that points 2 and 3 of Art.
47 directly
conflict with the CRB, the ECHR and other international documents on human
rights. If the .means of
expression.
of a certain manifestation
of faith were a threat to society and public order, they would certainly be
indictable under other laws, not just a religious one. Thus, prohibiting a means
of expression that is not a crime in itself constitutes censorship as well as
violations of freedom of conscience, religion and speech by the body for
religious control. If there is a crime, it can and should be persecuted under
the general penal statute, not a specialized religious law.
Chapter Seven The heavy fines imposed on
the exercise of religion not controlled by the state are troubling. The entire
chapter should be dropped. Art.
57. Providing access of a state
body for control over conscience cannot be given higher priority than the
inviolability of home and the right to an undisturbed private life
(Art. 8
of the
ECHR).
These rights can be limited
only in extraordinary circumstances, and the exertion of state control over
people.s faith is not one of them. Art.
58. This
Article makes the teaching of religious belief
within a program that has not been approved by two state agencies subject to a
fine. This is a preposterous provision, since hundreds and thousands of
religious programs and trainings, practiced in hundreds of faith-communities and
churches, would be subject to it. This text is an inadmissible violation of the
right to religion and exercise of religion, and it violates the prohibition
against state judgment of theological notions. Conclusion
on the Milchev-Krikoryan bill
In conclusion, the
Milchev-Krikoryan bill cannot serve as a model for an eventual new law on
freedom of religion in Bulgaria. This bill must be entirely rewritten - with a
new spirit, and a new line. Its General Provisions in Chapter One introduce
unacceptable restrictions on freedom of religion (Articles 2,
4, 5, and
9). The entire Chapter Four
should be dropped or rewritten. The authors need to comport more closely with
the way freedom of religion and exercise of religion is treated in the ECHR and
by the Experts from the Council of Europe, not merely declare their intention to
do so
(See
Motives for the
Bill). If we assume, for a moment,
that the bill were passed in its present draft, it would follow one of two
courses: (1)
remain a dead law because
its restrictive nature, in letter and in spirit, render it unenforceable; or
(2)
if strictly applied, lead to
the creation of a police state with a large agency apparatus attached to an
executive body on religious matters. This would be the end of freedom in
Bulgaria, for if the state controlled the consciences of believers, it would
inevitably spread its control over any other kind of beliefs, and suppress them
in favor of ones the authorities wished to impose. SPECIFIC
PROBLEMS OF THE TZEKOV BILL Here we touch on some of the
more important flaws of the Tzekov bill. It should be noted that the differences
between this bill and the one submitted to the Experts from the Council of
Europe are negligible. Some of the texts have remained from the draft of the
so-called .consolidated. bill discussed in the 38th National Assembly
in 2000-2001. Chapter
One
Art.
1. There are problems right
from the beginning of this bill, with the first provision. In spite of explicit
remarks of the Experts from the Council of Europe
expressing the need for a
clear designation of the addressees (the persons
whom the bill concerns),
the author again gives the
law scope only for .Bulgarian citizens.. Article 6
of the bill introduces three
categories covering different emigrational status: Bulgarian citizens, permanent
residents, and refugees. It is unclear where temporary residents and
non-citizens fall. Apparently, according to the author, they cannot participate
in a religious community. It also becomes confusing why Art. 6 refers to these
categories of persons, since the law provides for the right to religious
confession for Bulgarian citizens only under Art. 1
(and
Art.
2, par.
2). This confusion destroys
the inner logic of the bill
(See also
Art.
28,
par.
1). Returning
to the initial recommendation: a future law on freedom of religion in Bulgaria
must use terms that are as close as possible to the those in the ECHR and other
international documents. Thus, instead of .citizens,. which implies relations
between an individual and the state, the legislator should use the terms
.everyone. and .all,. or even .people.. This would help avoid ambiguity and
undesirable restrictions of rights that entail unclear legal consequences.
Art.
3.
Similarly to the
Milchev-Krikoryan bill, national security and the pursuit of political purposes
are also introduced here as grounds for restricting the right to freedom of
religion.
As already explained, these
restrictions are not in compliance with European standards, although they can be
found in the CRB. The ECHR abrogates repugnant provisions in the CRB - Art.
13,
par. 4
and Art.
37, par.
2 in this
case.
Art.
5.
The text of this Article
constitutes a serious problem. Right after declaring in the previous Article
that religious institutions should be separated from the state and that it is
unacceptable for the state to intervene in the internal life of religious
institutions, this provision orders exactly the opposite. The text states that a
specific institution would be delineated as spokesman and representative of a
particular faith. Furthermore, this text gives
ex
lege status to the legal entity
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC), a status granted to no other faith or
religious institution. It is one thing to declare that Eastern orthodoxy is a
traditional faith in Bulgaria, no matter how senseless it is to assert a
cultural feature by law. It is another thing altogether to take a theological
approach to a bill in this way, which more or less nationalizes one particular
denomination of Christianity.[15]
Whether the BOC wishes to be
led by the Holy Synod, as the state representative insists, remains unclear .
the church is denied the opportunity to settle its internal affairs without
external intervention. If this bill were to become law, or if a similar were
approved in a future law, this sort of intervention would be effected by
authority of law, even though the statement of the legislator that the BOC is a
member of .the One, holy, congregational and apostolic church. being purely
theological, is inadmissible. Churches and religions, BOC included, should be
allowed to define their theological doctrine on their
own. Art. 5 violates the
principle of separation of church and state. The state is here allowed to
intervene in the internal organizational life of religious institutions, as well
as granting preferential treatment to one religious confession at the expense of
other groups. All of these flaws
can be found in the text of the Tzekov bill as
reviewed. Art.
9-13. These Articles concern the
registration of religious communities in order to obtain status as legal
entities. A double arrangement for registration is introduced . for the
Headquarters of the religious confessions in front of Sofia City Court (SCC),
and for local branches in front of their respective regional courts.
Those involved in the
registration process are the SCC, the Directorate on Religious Confessions,
regional courts, and mayors. It is unclear why mayors are involved in the
registration process, but the burden of keeping a registry of religious groups
and their representatives is imposed on them. The resolutions of the SCC are
promulgated in the State Gazette. This procedure is disorganized and ponderous,
as well as opening up the possibility for abuse by the authorities in keeping
the registries. The following question also remains unclear - what legal
consequences would arise for a local branch if it is registered in a regional
court, but not in the mayor.s registry? This creates a complicated
and unnecessary system for obtaining legal entity status. The right to
association is also endangered. Other non-profit organizations do not have to go
through anywhere near so complicated a procedure, which shows an obvious
discrimination against religions.
Chapter
Three
This chapter concerns the
obliteration of a religious community.s legal
entity/institution. Art. 14
(2). According to this Article,
the Directorate on Religious Confessions can give an .expert conclusion. upon
dissolution of a religious institution. What would be the nature of such a
conclusion, given the fact that the state is not allowed to judge religious
beliefs and people.s convictions?[16]
Obviously, it is out of
ignorance or negligence that the authors do not conform to this principle.
Art.
15,
p.
1. Here too, the text quotes
the use of freedom of religion for .political purposes, against national
security and for stirring up racial, ethnic and religious strife. as grounds for
commencing a shutdown of a religious institution, which also conflicts with Art.
9 of the ECHR. It is not by chance that the
Convention makes a comprehensive list of possible grounds for restricting
religious freedom in Art. 9,
par. 2
of the ECHR, with the
above-mentioned not among them. If Christian missionaries preached about Jesus
Christ
in regions with a Muslim
population, would that not be considered as .stirring up of
racial, ethnic and religious strife.
by interested groups or
authorities? We should also not forget that the right to freedom of religion
includes the right of believers to exhort and convert
others to their faith as well. As the Experts from the Council of
Europe
emphasize, the tension that
pluralism in religious beliefs causes is not in itself a ground for restricting
pluralism and religious freedom. The role of the state is simply to ensure
tolerance between different groups.[17]
I
would go even further by saying that the state should not even play a strong
role in ensuring tolerance, since freedom of conscience entails allowing for
personal disagreement with a religion, and views of intolerance. As long as
intolerance does not manifest as aggression, the state should impose no
restrictions whatsoever on free debate and expression of disagreement between
believers of different religions.
The state only needs to protect order and people.s security, preventing
crimes against individuals and their property, including those that result from
religious intolerance. What the state cannot do, simply, is impose beliefs or
restrict them.[18] Chapter
Four
This chapter deals with the
activities of religious institutions. Art. 19
(1).
A redundant
text, unless the author assumes that without such a text religious institutions
would not be allowed to hire and acquire premises and buildings for public
worship. (2)
What is the
need for a separate entrance? Is it a question of manufacture and trade with
dangerous substances and weapons? Is it not normal for a lessee and a lessor to
decide how to solve such issues without having to turn to the authority of law?
(3)
A redundant
text. Of course, public assemblies are to be carried out under the provisions of
the Law on Assemblies, Meetings and Manifestations. Religious assemblies in the
open,
as any other
assembly in the open, have either an educational, political, or an
entertainment-focused purpose. Art. 26
(2). It is unclear
what the author meant by .the exclusive right. of religious institutions to
propagate religious information
.relevant to the
respective religious confession..
This is a
restriction on the fundamental constitutional right to freedom of assembly, and
on the propagation of opinions and information. For example, everyone can
distribute the Bible and publish it upon arrangement of copyright and
translation issues.
Art.
28. This Article
restricts freedom of speech by binding the right of association with a need for
permission. By delineating terms for association, it creates religious-based
discrimination. And once again, only citizens are stipulated as bearers of this
right. Para.
(2)
displays
a fundamental
lack of understanding of the role and essence of the right to freedom of
religion. The text states: .Legal
non-profit entities under par. 1
(created to
support a religious institution)
do not have the
right to participate in activities involving public exercise of a religious
confession.. It
must be noted again that a legal entity cannot exercise a religious confession .
whether in public or not. Only individuals have this right. The right to freedom
of conscience and religion is INDIVIDUAL. A legal entity is a legal fiction that
facilitates the association of individuals. It cannot think or feel; a legal
entity has no soul, it is not a human being, it cannot believe in God. A legal
entity can have ONLY PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS. A legal person, unlike a
real person, does not have basic human rights defending its basic freedoms and
dignity. It is not the legal entity that will exercise the right to religious
confession in public, but the individuals who have associated to create that
legal entity. Chapter
Five
Art.
30,
points 3
and
4. Both
the nature of the expert conclusions of the Directorate and the functions of the
.Expert
Advisory Committee. are as yet unclear, given the fact that the state cannot
have an opinion on theological matters. Chapter
Six
Leaving aside the huge size
of the fines, we will now focus on the grounds for imposing
them. Art.
31. This provision
denies freedom of religion and exercise of religion both in public and in
private. Apparently, no one can pray or preach in public without permission from
a religious institution, as freedom of religion can be exercised only through an
institution. This approach towards freedom of religion is another example of the
author.s lack of understanding of the essence of the right to freedom of
religion. It must be reiterated that with this Article as well, the right to
religious belief and expression are tied to the institution and not the
individual. This notion is in
complete conflict with the ECHR, the CRB, and the recommendations of the Experts
from the Council of Europe. In an attempt to impose
control over believers, the depositor of the bill applies the following six-step
formula:
What actually happens here
is a hundred-and-eighty-degree turnaround of the values of the rights. The right
to freedom of religion is complex, and sometimes its exercise coincides with
that of freedom of association as well. There is a definite correlation.
However, the bill, like Milchev.s, turns this correlation upside down . the
right to association becomes the principal right, and the individual and
absolute right to religious confession becomes dependent on the exercise of the
ancillary right to association. Thus, the registration of a legal entity . a
right that is second in importance . becomes a central factor in the exercise of
the freedom of conscience and religion. If this logic has not been
well enough illustrated in the above comparisons, we ought to take a look at the
Additional Provision as well. I will quote the provision so that the intent of
the author of the Tzekov bill becomes clear: .Religious
confession.
denotes
a religious community and its religious institution registered under the terms
and order of this law. Going back to the notes on
terminology in the beginning of this presentation, we will see that the
provision calls faith a .registered institution.! Religious confession has a
double meaning. If we replace .religious confession. in the quoted provision
with .religion. or .faith,. the text will read: Faith
(or
religion)
denotes
a religious community and its religious institution registered under the terms
and order of this law. This wording reveals the
gist of the formula for control over conscience and religious confession.
Inexplicably, the authors of the bill give a definition in this part of the
bill, and not in the beginning. The use of the conjunction .and. in the phrase
binds .religious confession. not only to the community of believers, but to the institution of that community. One is not
only obliged to believe in a community, but this community has to be an
institutional community .registered. under the religious law! This definition
denies the right of religious people to exercise religion individually, or
together with others, without having been registered in an .institution. and
together with others registered abroad. Conclusion
on the Tzekov bill
An appropriate attitude
toward the freedom of religion and exercise of religion would call for the
removal of administrative, legal and bureaucratic obstacles, and not the
erection of new barriers to believers and their activity. This is the intent of
the CRB and the ECHR, and it ought to be the underlining principle in the
drafting of a future law on this matter. The legislator must accept
axiomatically the statement that the opinion of the individual on the issue of
religion should not lead to restrictions, just as the opinion of an individual
on issues of physics or geometry would not do so.
The Tzekov bill has too
exceedingly negative an attitude toward freedom of religion to be considered fit
for enactment. Moreover, it clearly reveals a lack of understanding for the
philosophy and essence of the right to religious confession (or freedom of
religion and exercise of religion). The Tzekov bill denies the individual and
absolute nature of the right to religious confession and attempts to whittle it
down to a right that is subject to state registration and control. To this end,
the bill introduces ridiculous wordings of some fundamental formulations of the
right to freedom of religion and conscience. It is unacceptable for a
legislature that strives to become democratic and reach the standards of civil
society to allow for a bill with such a philosophy to be one of its central
sources of operational ideas. In general, the treatment of
the right to freedom of religion in this bill is radically different from that
of the other two. This is evident from the very title of the document: Law on
Religious Rights and Religious Association. To a large extent, this bill does
what a future law on the freedom of religion ought to do . it further develops
the right to freedom of conscience and religion and its exercise, based on
already-settled law in the CRB and the ECHR. In other words, this bill does not
have a deceptive facade . it does not introduce seemingly democratic texts and
then follow them later with provisions that conflict with the Constitution and
the Convention. However, the authors do not
develop completely the democratic aspect of freedom of religion. Although the
intent demonstrated in the bill is on the right track, the bill needs to be
improved by dropping a number of restrictive provisions.
Chapter
One
Art.
9
prohibits the preaching of
religious intolerance and religious-based animosity. This wording could possibly
be used to restrict the expression of religious beliefs. It is unclear according
to which criteria a preaching or a teaching would be judged as .religious
intolerance.. As an example, a central tenet of Christian faith preaches that
one can be saved from his sins and know God only through the Son of God, Jesus
Christ. Such a statement is an offense to many who profess other religions (and
has been the ground for persecution of Christians since the earliest years of
Christianity). In spite of the freedom of conscience, some non-Christians would
consider this doctrine as a preaching of
.religious intolerance. or .stirring up of animosity.. Therefore, the
text of Art. 9 is adequate only to the extent that it prohibits religious-based
violence. The other prohibitions might be interpreted so broadly that freedom of
conscience would be restricted. Chapter
Two
The registration of a
religious group as a legal entity is done in court. We can derive per
argumentum a contrario from Articles 11 and 12 that a religious
organization can choose to register as a legal entity, or not. A future law
should make it explicit that freedom of religion denotes exercise and expression
of religious beliefs both individually and with others, with or without
association, with or without registration. Such an emphasis would highlight the
fact that the right to religious confession is much more than a group of people
registering an organization under certain rules. Art.
17
duly stipulates a two-week
period within which the court will rule on the motion for establishment of a
religious group as a legal entity. Compared to the procedures in the other two
bills, this one is simplified and, as a whole, quite moderate.
Art.
21. In
this Article, unfortunately, the authors
have committed the same mistake as the authors of the other bills concerning the
grounds for restricting the right to freedom of religion. Article 21 states that
the court can deny registration of the organization of a religious community if
it has political purposes or jeopardizes national security. The ethical
statements that religion leads its adherents to make could easily be interpreted
as political aspirations. For example, if a religious group protested against
the legalization of homosexual marriages or euthanasia, such statements could be
used as evidence of using religion for political purposes. Thus, if this ground
for restriction
is stipulated by law,
freedom of religion could be restricted. Art.
33
and
35
properly
stipulate tax relief for donations made to religious organizations and for
charitable donations made by these organizations. This relief is not a
religious-based preference; instead, it reflects the need for encouraging
charity. It is a well-known fact that religious organizations, especially
Christian ones, are famous for helping the weak, the poor, and the
underprivileged in society. Tax relief helps foster virtuousness and charity,
which are features of people in a free and civil society. Art.
40
raises a number of questions
with its statement that a religious educational institution cannot select its
students on a religious basis. While it is logical and just that the law place
such a requirement for the care of aged, helpless or sick people, education is
quite a different domain. Faith is also a teaching; requiring a religious school
not to select its students according to their beliefs, would cause the school to
lose its religious character altogether, and overall constitutes state
intervention in the freedom of religion. If a religious group established, for
instance, a welfare institution to care for people only from its own faith, such
an institution might seem truly unfair.
However, even in such cases, which are rare in real life, restrictions on
religious groups. ability to create such institutions must be carefully
formulated, as after all, it deals with a private, not a state institution. The
state is not allowed to freely determine the operational philosophy of private
structures. Art.
41-42. According to these Articles,
the state body that deals with issues of religion and freedom of religion would
be the Directorate on Religious Rights, which would have only
statistical-informational and ancillary functions. Such purposes are in harmony
with a positive, not a controlling, vision of state participation in religious
life. Conclusion
on the Mestane-Yusseine bill
The attitude of this bill
toward freedom of religion and its exercise, in comparison to the other two,
reveals a more profound understanding for this important and
complex
right. With some needed
improvements and the removal of some restrictive provisions that conflict with
the CRB, the ECHR and the advice of Experts from the Council of Europe, the
Mestan-Yusseine bill could be used in the drafting of a new law on freedom of
religion in Bulgaria. The underlining principles of this bill would aid the
establishment of freedom of conscience and religion as already guaranteed in the
CRB and the ECHR. This is a significant difference from the attempts to regulate
and control conscience that are found in the other two bills.
In this part, we will
briefly outline the standards that should shape a new law on the freedom of
religion and the free exercise of religion, which if adhered to could create a
fair, applicable, and first-rate law. The law should reinforce the values of
free civil society, which Bulgaria must continue to strive to
adopt.
These standards are derived
from both international documents and the highest-ranking internal Bulgarian
law
on freedom of conscience and
religion. They also result from the experience of free civil societies where the
exercise of religion in full respect of individual freedom has proved its
utility toward social order and welfare. Following are the basic principles we
recommend to be applied in drafting a future law on the freedom of
religion: 1.
Right of
the human
individual:
The freedom of religion is a
right of
the individual,
not а
right of an organization or
a legal entity. The state cannot make religious expression allowable only by its
permission, including by binding the exercise of faith to a religious
institution. 2.
Settlement:
The freedom of religion and
free exercise of religion are already guaranteed in internal Bulgarian
law
by the CRB and the ECHR, the
Convention preempting the Constitution in cases of conflict. A law should only
further develop specific dimensions of these freedoms, not redefine and restrict
them. 3.
Duality
is inadmissible in a future law on the
freedom of religion. Duality exists when one part of the law proclaims freedom
of faith and its exercise, and another one, a conflicting enactment, denies this
freedom and introduces restrictions. 4.
A
complex right:
The freedom of religion is a
complex
right, both in internal and external sense: In an internal
sense.regarding
the internal essence of the
right: Basic
right.one of the most
important rights guaranteeing the freedom and dignity of the human
individual. Absolute
right.granted by the
Creator, not by the state.[19] Inviolable
right.no one can rob
an individual of this right, except by taking an individual.s
life. Individual
right.the human
individual is the only bearer of the right to freedom of conscience and
religion; organizations and associations have no soul or mind and cannot be
bearers of this right.[20] In an external
sense.through
interaction with other
rights: Freedom of
religion and free exercise of religion is carried out in
combination with other basic human rights and freedoms . the freedom
of speech, of association, of assembly, of change of beliefs, of obtaining and
distributing information. The violation of the freedom of religion and free
exercise of religion inevitably leads to restricting one or more of these basic
human rights and freedoms. Restriction of freedom of conscience and religious
faith is the first step toward establishing a despotic
regime.
5.
Non-discrimination: Religious beliefs must not
be treated differently from other beliefs. The
establishment of religious associations cannot be subjected to more difficult
processes than that of other associations, e.g. atheist ones.
6.
Legal
positivism: A new law on religious
matters cannot regulate the expression of religious beliefs by individuals or
organizations, with permits or otherwise. The simplest way to define the
positive approach in legislation would be that anything not explicitly
prohibited by law is permitted.
This is the only acceptable
approach for democracies in the sphere of religious freedom. 7.
The
terminology of basic notions must be in
compliance with that used in the ECHR and the recommendations of the European
experts.
The terms should be clearly
defined and used in a consistent manner throughout the entire
law. 8.
The
title
of the law should reflect
its purpose and further develop already-settled law establishing freedom of
conscience and religion. We recommend the title .Law on Freedom of
Religion in Bulgaria,. or one along similar lines. 9.
Restrictions
on the right to freedom of
religion should be standardized with those of Art.
9
of the ECHR, as the Experts
from the Council of Europe recommend[21]
(see below). 10.
The right
to freedom of religion includes also the freedom to exhort others to change
their beliefs and convert them to one.s faith. The clear
definition of this aspect of freedom of conscience will check the growth of many
conflicts. At this point, some basic
points should be recalled from the highly critical analysis[22]
of the bill for a Law on
Religious Confessions of the 38th National Assembly made by Experts
from the Council of Europe. The European Experts suggested the following
principles when drafting and analyzing a law on the right of
religion: (а)
Basic
right:
according to the definitions
of Art. 9
of the ECHR, the freedom of
thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of democratic
society; (b)
Multi-dimensional
right:
includes its exercise
individually, together with others, with or without association, and the right
to exhort others; (c) Non-discrimination:
equal treatment of different
religious groups; (d)
The state does not
judge any religion or belief; (e) Autonomy:
non-intervention of the
state in the exercise of the right; (f)
Free
choice of governance:
the state cannot determine
even the principles of choice of governance in view of ensuring an
ecclesiastical[23]
unity; (g)
The right is subject to some
restrictions, which, in a democratic society, (h)
must be
necessary:
there must be an urgent
social need for imposing them, and
(i)
legal .
settled by
law;
(j)
Pluralism:
the tension between
religious groups is an inevitable consequence of democracy, and tension is not
to be alleviated through state-imposed standardization of thought, conscience
and religion. Taking these principles into
consideration, in addition to the ones we have already mentioned, will further
enrich the understanding of the European pattern of thought in drafting a law on
freedom of religion. The Bulgarian legislator has the unique opportunity to draw
on the traditions of world democracies when introducing the rules of free civil
society in Bulgaria through the passing of a law on the freedom of religion that
complies with international law, the highest-ranking internal Bulgarian law, and
the recommendations of experts on freedom of religion.
The Tzekov and
Milchev-Krikoryan bills cannot be used as a basis for passing a law on freedom
of religion in Bulgaria. Although supporting some of the provisions of the
Constitution on freedom of faith, these bills contradict such support by
displaying a regressive sort of thinking that attempts to regulate religion and
restrict its freedom.
This is an inappropriate
orientation and spirit in which to pass a new law on freedom of religion in
Bulgaria. Such a law needs to further develop already-defined principles of
freedom of religion that are settled in the highest-ranking Bulgarian
legislature. These principles are also specific enactments of the Constitution
and the ECHR, Art. 9, in force in
the entire territory of the Republic of Bulgaria. A future law on these matters
ought to be truly a law on freedom of religion, not another futile
attempt at a .law on religious confessions. that calls to mind past ideologies
that oppressed religious freedom. In order for such a law to
become a reality, and to be a fair law, the Bulgarian legislator should reject
the view that religion should be subject to special control. On the contrary,
freedom of conscience and religion needs to be especially promoted because of
the obscure traditions of repressing religion in Bulgaria. The myths that a
believer is socially inadequate or malevolent is a lie our society must get rid
of. Secondly, the legislator
must comply with the theoretical and practical recommendations of the Experts
from the Council of Europe,
which are born of a far more
democratic tradition in the sphere of religious freedom[24]. The prosperity of western
society is a testimony by itself that religious freedom is not a threat to the
foundations of society, but quite the opposite - it fosters its prosperity.
After
all, passing a law on freedom of religion is not crucial to the sustainable
establishment of true religious freedom in Bulgaria. Religious freedom is well
enough settled in the Constitution and the ECHR. The only thing that has to be
done now is to settle the re-registration of already existing legal entities of
so-called .religious confessions,. registered under the Law on Religious
Confessions from 1949,
into
legal entities under the Law for Non-Profit Legal Entities. This will put an end
to the treatment of religious faith and believers as some sort of peculiar
strata. The existence of a body at the CM such as the Directorate on Freedom of
Religion could only be justified in view of studying development trends in
different religious beliefs and representing the state in its efforts toward
fostering an air of mutual consent between different groups. As radical as this prospect
may seem . absence of any regulation of conscience and religion . it is
feasible, and it shows the right direction. The state cannot control people.s
consciences anyway, so it suffices to ensure order and civil
peace. One of the leading
democracies, that of the United States, exists on the basis of this very
principle . people there are not controlled by the state on the grounds of their
faith, but on the grounds of their behavior, and specifically when it breaks the
law. Regulation of religion is very rare in the United States, but that does not
preclude a constant social debate (and pleadings in court) on the scope of
religious freedom.[25]
And the state and its
administrative structures do not participate in this debate as a mechanism for
shaping views. Although far removed from Bulgarian reality, this model
represents legal positivism, which is the principle behind civil society. In
other words, people in civil societies do not rely on the state for everything;
they are free to conduct their affairs as they wish, in respect of the law.
Furthermore, the state is not threatened by the fact that its citizens are free
to make their own decisions in areas of life where the state has no competence.
Apropos this setting of
total confidence in people.s consciences and exercise of faith, even if there
were a law on religion, it ought to deal with only a limited range of issues -
for example, restitution of property to religious groups and restructuring of
.religious confessions. into legal non-profit entities registered under the
general order. This arrangement would guarantee freedom of religion in Bulgaria,
bring the country
closer to a status of civil society, and enhance decisionmaking responsibility
of citizens and non-citizens as well as their. Last but not least, such an
approach would increase people.s trust in the state and its ability to govern
the country. By liberating the arrangement of control over the freedom of
religion, governors will show that they are not afraid of people.s consciences
and beliefs, but that they care for and will protect their growth as free and
responsible individuals. Sofia,
May 2002 The
Center for Religious Freedom is a project of Door of Hope International . an
international Christian charity and human rights
organization. About
the author:
Viktor
Kostov is a religious liberty lawyer studying for a doctoral degree on the Christian mission and
religious freedom at Fuller Theological Seminary,
Los
Angeles,
California,
USA. He is Director
of the Center for Religious Freedom Project of Door of Hope International, an
international Christian charity and legal defense
organization. He is
also the author of articles on the issues of religious freedom and church-state
relations in the USA and Bulgaria. The
author of the report wishes to thank the advisors on religious freedom at the
Center for Religious Freedom.lawyers
Nevena Stefanova and
Ekaterina
Katrafilova,
as
well as Mr. Krassimir Momchev
for
collaborating and contributing to the elaboration of this report. The bills were
made available for analysis through the kind assistance of the Human Rights and
Religious Confessions Committee at the 39th
National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria. All
rights reserved by the author
©
Viktor Kostov
2002 and
the CRF.
To
receive permission for reproducing this document or parts thereof, please send
e-mail to:
vikkostov@hotmail.com. Insertion
of hyperlinks to the Internet publication of the document is unrestricted.
The
report can be viewed at URL:
http://bclf.tripod.com/religiousbill.htm
in Bulgarian and
http://bclf.tripod.com/religiousbillengl.htm
in English. Bibliography Protection
of minority groups:
modern
international standards. Sofia: Institute for the
Study of Integration,
2001. .In defense of
religious freedom:
Selected resolutions of the
Supreme Court of the USA on religion.
in Tolerance
For You. Bulletin of Tolerance
Foundation, special edition, Sofia
2002. Bourghental,
Thomas and Stanimir
Alexandrov.
International
Law on Human Rights. Sofia:
Center for the Study of
Democracy,
1997. Religion
and Human Rights: Basic Documents. New York: Center for the
Study of Human Rights Columbia University, 1998. Working
documents in chronological order: By
request of the Council of Europe:
Summary
of the main conclusions of principle presented in an Opinion and a Summary
Draft
by Prof.
L.L.
Kristian,
Leuven-la Neuve University,
Belgium; Opinion, Prof.
Malcolm
Evans,
Bristol
University,
Great
Britain;
Opinion
by Prof.
Dr.
R.А.
Lossen,
in collaboration with Dr.
B.К.
Labuchane
and Mr. К.
Goluke,
Lei den University,
Holland,
on Draft Bill on Religious
Confessions in Bulgaria,
January-February
2001. Tzekov,
Borislav. Law
on Religious Confessions.
Draft
introduced in the 39th National Assembly.
Sofia:
July
7,
2001. Milchev, Kiril
and Roupen Krikoryan. Law
on Religious Confessions.
Draft
introduced in the 39th National Assembly.
Sofia:
April
24,
2002. Mestan, Lyutvi
and Ahmed Yusseine.
Law
on Religious Rights and Religious Association.
Draft
introduced in the 39th National Assembly.
Sofia:
April
24,
2002. [1]
The Expert Opinion of the Experts
from the Council of Europe was
presented and analyzed for the Bulgarian
public on July 2, [2]
[3]
Art [4]
Art [5]
Not even the Constitutional Court
of Bulgaria has
[6] See the detailed analysis of the
[7]
The use of the
term [8]
Expert opinion of the Council of
Europe [9]
[10]
[11]
Expert opinion of Experts from
the Council of Europe, Bulgarian
translation [12]
The Experts from the Council of
Europe state [13]
The grounds for restricting [14]
I have described
the specific mechanism
for [15]
A document on [16]
.The right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by the
Convention precludes any
resolution of the state aiming to determine whether
certain religious beliefs or the means
for exercising
them are legal, [17]
The Expert Opinion,
p [18]
Apart from the restrictions
already mentioned [19]
The Theory of Natural Rights is
fundamental to understanding human rights and [20]
[21]
The Expert Opinion of the Council
of Europe p [22]
The Expert
Opinion [23]
Church-organizational [24]
Western experience, however,
ought to be applied selectively.
France is a negative example as
to how some western countries can take measures seriously
endangering the freedom of
religion and conscience. In May 2001,
t [25]
To read more on this issue in
Bulgarian, see
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